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6.1  Introduction and Summary 
The volatility of the real exchange rate exhibited in recent years has 
led to a growing concern regarding the need for labor market adjustment 
in the presence of  misalignment. It is important to recognize that the 
potential role of policies stems not from the volatility per se but from 
the consequences of unanticipated shocks in the presence of an insti- 
tutional structure that limits the flexibility of adjustment. In the absence 
of rigidities and with complete markets, volatility should not concern 
the policymaker. Thus, an assessment of the role of policies can be 
conducted after we specify a framework that allows for the presence 
of  rigidities. 
The purpose of this paper is to address the nature of adjustment and 
the role of policies in an economy characterized by labor contracts that 
limit the flexibility of wage adjustment. Specifically, I postulate a sto- 
chastic monopolistic competitive economy, where wage negotiations 
are carried out every several periods because of the presence of trans- 
action costs.' These costs can reflect the expenses of  collecting and 
processing information, as well as direct output losses associated with 
a time-consuming negotiation process. The wage negotiation  periods 
are assumed to be distributed uniformly over time. This distribution 
results in wage and price paths that differ across firms according to the 
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timing of their most recent pricing decision. Following the construction 
of the building  blocks  of the economy,  we derive the optimal wage 
presetting  rule.  Such a rule  is characterized by two elements. First, 
for a given frequency of wage negotiation, we derive the optimal path 
of wages to be preset at the beginning of each contract cycle. Second, 
we solve for the optimal frequency of wage negotiation. 
Armed with the optimal wage presetting rule, I analyze the evolution 
of goods prices and the implication of the wage presetting rule for the 
aggregate economy. Specifically, I investigate the adjustment of output, 
exchange rate, prices, employment, and wages  to nominal and real 
shocks. The discussion focuses on the dependency of the adjustment 
on the market power enjoyed by each producer.  The analysis shows 
that unexpected monetary shocks can generate persistent aggregate 
output and relative price shocks whose nature is determined by the 
degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods. Greater 
substitutability induces a greater output and employment effects and 
smaller price effects in the short and the intermediate run. On the other 
hand, greater substitutability  is shown to reduce the persistency and 
duration of the adjustment. These results follow from the observation 
that a larger substitutability is associated with shorter wage contracts. 
Thus, a greater degree of substitutability has two opposing effects-it 
raises the magnitude but reduces the duration of the output and em- 
ployment shocks resulting from a given monetary innovation. 
The details of the adjustment to real shocks are more involved, being 
determined by the magnitude of the income elasticity of the demand 
for money and the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods. 
If the income elasticity of the demand for money is less than unity (as 
is suggested by empirical studies) the presence of nominal wage con- 
tracts tends to magnify  the responsiveness of  the economy to real 
shocks, and a larger degree of substitutability  will magnify the short- 
run and the intermediate-run  adjustment of prices and output to real 
shocks and will reduce the needed adjustment of relative prices.  The 
direction  of  the nominal  exchange rate adjustment induced by  real 
shocks is shown to be determined by the size of the income elasticity 
of the demand for money and by the substitutability between domestic 
and foreign goods. Large (small) elasticities are associated with a nom- 
inal appreciation (depreciation) in the presence of expansionary real 
shocks. An important feature of our staggered framework is that the 
speed of adjustment to real and nominal shocks accelerates during the 
adjustment. It is noteworthy that the result regarding the accelerated 
speed of adjustment differs from the one obtained applying linear models, 
where typically the speed of adjustment drops during the cycle. 
Section 6.6 evaluates the potential role of labor market policies in 
the presence of misalignment.  I  distinguish between two sources of 171  Monopoly and Labor Market Adjustment 
misalignment. The first is due to a large realization of the nominal or 
real shocks. The second is due to structural shocks that change the 
underlying parameters, like a change in  the substitutability between 
various goods, a change in the share of  labor in the GNP, changes in 
the covariance  structure of  the  shocks, and  so  forth. The analysis 
demonstrates that a wage rule  that  will  index the wage to nominal 
income will stabilize employment in  the presence of the first type of 
shocks.  Such a rule, however,  will  not  stabilize employment in  the 
presence of the second type of shocks: accommodation to structural 
shocks will  necessitate  wage renegotiation and a change in  the fre- 
quency of wage adjustment. 
Section 6.2  describes the model by formulating the goods, the money, 
and the labor  market.  Section 6.3 derives  the  long-run equilibrium 
where all prices and wages are flexible. Section 6.4  studies the dynamics 
of adjustment to monetary and real shocks. Section 6.5 discusses the 
factors determining contract length, and section 6.6 evaluates the role 
of labor market policies in the presence of misalignment. Section 6.7 
closes the paper with concluding remarks. 
6.2  The Model 
In this section I outline the building blocks of the model. I start with 
the goods market specification and conclude with the labor and the 
money market. 
6.2.1  The Goods Market 
Consider an economy characterized  by  producers  organized in  a 
monopolistic competitive manner. There are two classes of goods- 
domestic and foreign. All domestic producers are facing the same de- 
mand function and share the same technology. Demand facing producer 
k is given by 
(1)  Dk  = (P/Pk)’ (EP*/Pk)a,  OL  + p > 1, 
where p is the average price of domestic goods, E is the exchange rate, 
P*  is the average price of foreign goods (in units of the foreign currency), 
and Pk is the price of good K.2  I assume a large number of domestic 
producers (denoted by h),  such that each of them treats p as given.3 I 
denote by p the demand elasticity with respect to the competing do- 
mestic goods. The substitutability between domestic and foreign goods 
is measured by a,  and for simplicity of exposition I invoke the law of 
one price for foreign goods.4 
The production function of each domestic producer is characterized 
by 
(2)  xk  = Q(Lk)’, 172  Joshua Aizenman 
where Lk is the labor employed in the production of good  k, and Q 
stands for labor productivity. Aggregate output is denoted by x,  where 
(3)  8 = 2 P,X,/P. 
Suppose we start from an initial equilibrium. Let us use lowercase 
letters for the logarithm of the uppercase variable. Thus, for a variable 
2,  z  = log 2. For example, applying equations (1) and (3) yields that 
the (percentage) change in output is proportional to the change in the 
terms of trade: 
(4)  k = aA(e - p). 
6.2.2  The Labor and the Money Markets 
For the purpose of my analysis I will distinguish between two types 
of  labor  markets.  In  the first case,  I  will  consider  a flexible prices 
economy where the labor market always clears. This corresponds to 
the case where wages are fully flexible and where the labor market is 
cleared in an auction manner. The usefulness of this environment stems 
from providing the benchmark economy for my subsequent discussion, 
where I will allow for the presence of  nominal contracts in the labor 
market.  In  this  benchmark  economy money  is  neutral,  because all 
prices are flexible to adjust fully to the state of  liquidity. Thus, the 
benchmark economy  serves to define the long-run equilibrium.  The 
presence of nominal contracts will introduce a distinction between the 
long, the intermediate,  and the short run.  Among other topics,  my 
analysis will study the factors determining the effective duration of the 
short and the intermediate run. 
Consider the case where labor is employed subject to nominal con- 
tracts that preset the wage path for several periods, where within the 
contract duration employment is demand determined. To simplify no- 
tation I normalize the labor force to h (the number of firms) and assume 
an inelastic long-run supply of labor.s The presetting rule is governed 
by the notion that wages are preset at a level that is expected to clear 
the labor market facing the producer. Let W denote the money wage 
rate. Application of equations (1) and (2) yields the dependency of the 
price charged by producer k on the money wage: 
(5)  Pk  =  (p" + e) + a2p  + a3w  + 0(c - 3 4) 
where q  = I/y 
0  = 1/[1  + (3 - 1) (a  + p) 1 
c = log {?(a + P)/(a  + p - 1) } 
a, = a  (q - 1)0 
a2 = p(q - l)0 and 
a, = 0. 173  Monopoly and Labor Market Adjustment 
Note that the sum of the elasticities of Pk  with respect to foreign prices 
(a,),  the wage (a2),  and domestic competitors’ prices  (a3)  adds up to 
one: a, + a2 + a3 = 1. This is a reflection of the homogeneity postulate, 
implying that an equiproportional rise in all prices will not affect the 
real equilibrium. The relative importance of foreign prices in the de- 
termination of the domestic price Pk  is characterized by the substitut- 
ability  of  domestic  and  foreign  goods.  As  we  approach  perfect 
substitutability  (i.e., as a  + a), we approach an absolute purchasing 
power parity (PPP) pricing rule, where p  = p* + e.6 
I conclude this section with the specification of the money market. 
Let us denote by M the supply of money and consider a simple money 
demand function: 
(6)  m=p+ci 
where 6 is the income elasticity of the demand for money.’  We  turn 
now  to the  characterization  of  the  long-run, flexible price  equilib- 
rium. 
6.3  The Long-Run Equilibrium 
The long-run equilibrium is characterized by flexibility of wages and 
prices. In such an economy all domestic producers are facing the same 
demand and supply conditions. As a result, in this equilibrium all pro- 
ducers will employ L  =  1 and will charge the same price  (Pk = p). 
Applying equations (1) and (2) yields that the long-run PPP ratio is 
equal to: 
(7)  e  + p* -p = qla. 
The PPP ratio is determined by two factors-the  measure of the effi- 
ciency of production ((3) and the substitutability between domestic and 
foreign goods (a).  A rise in domestic efficiency (d q > 0) or a drop in 
the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods is associated 
with a deterioration in the terms of trade. As one might expect, the 
long-run equilibrium is independent of monetary considerations.  Ap- 
plying (7) to (5) we infer that the producer’s real wage is 
(8)  w -  p  = q - c. 
The term c represents the markup pricing rule, where the price is a 
markup of wages. From the definition of c (see [5] ), it follows that the 
markup rate drops with (Y  + p, which corresponds to the degree of 
substitutability. It can be also shown that as a + p + a  we approach 
the competitive outcome, where the labor bill share approaches y. We 
turn now to an analysis of the short and the intermediate run. 174  Joshua Aizenman 
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6.4  The Short and the Intermediate Run 
The purpose of this section is to design a framework that will allow 
assessment of the short- and intermediate-run adjustment to unantic- 
ipated monetary and real shocks and the evaluation of economic factors 
determining the effective duration of the intermediate run. I introduce 
nominal rigidities by assuming that pricing decisions in the labor market 
are carried out every several periods because of the presence of trans- 
action costs associated with frequent wage negotiation.8 I consider the 
case where labor is employed subject to contracts that preset the wage 
path for n periods, where within the contract duration, employment is 
demand determined. At the beginning of each contract cycle, the con- 
tract sets the wage path for the next n periods. I start this section with 
the assumption that n is exogenously given and conclude with an anal- 
ysis of the endogenous determination of  n.9 
The wage in  period d that was preset h periods ago is denoted by 
W&,,  and the price charged by the producer who employs labor that 
is paid w&,  is denoted by Pd.h. For example, a producer who starts a 
contract cycle in t should negotiate at period t the path of (W,.",  wr+  I.I, 
. . .; Wr+n-l,n-l).  Figure 6.1 describes the prices and wages prevailing 
in our economy. At time t we observe n prices and a corresponding n 
wages, as described by the vertical vector. A producer charging pr." at 
period  t  is also presetting wages for the  next n - 1  periods, as is 
described by the horizontal vector. The presetting rule is governed by 
the notion that wages are preset at a level that is expected to clear the 
labor market facing the producer. In doing so, labor and management 
are using all the information regarding the wages that have already been 
set, the expected path of the exchange rate and foreign prices, and the 
prices that other competitors are expected to set in the future.'" Wages 
are set at time t for period t  + k  such that the goods market at time 
t  + k is expected to clear at the full employment output (L  = 1). Thus, 
applying equations (I), (2), we get: 175  Monopoly and Labor Market Adjustment 
(9)  Et  (qr+k) = p Et@t+k -  Pr+k,k) + 13  Er(et+k + P*f+k -  Pt+k.k) 
where E, denotes the conditional expectation operator, when expec- 
tations are conditional on the information at time t. Applying (9) to (5) 
we obtain 
(10)  Wt+k,k = Et  @t+k  + qr+k - c). 
We  assume a stable stochastic  structure, and  unsynchronized  price 
setting-that  is, that the contracts decision periods are distributed uni- 
formly over time. Within this assumption the complexity of the problem 
is reduced significantly. This assumption breaks the symmetry of all 
domestic producers that is observed in the flexible pricing equilibrium, 
while at the same time it imposes enough structure to allow a tractable 
solution. Within each period a fraction l/n of the producers determines 
the time path of prices. The result is pricing decisions for each period 
that differ across firms, according to the timing of their most recent 
wage contract negotiation.  Consequently, the domestic price level is 
given by 
i=  1 
Consider the case where we start at time zero in the long-run equi- 
librium, with contracts that are fully adjusted to all the past shocks. I 
would now like to study adjustment to real and nominal shocks. To 
simplify notation I assume that by the choice of units, all prices and 
aggregate output in the initial equilibrium are one (or zero in logarithmic 
terms). My subsequent analysis will focus on deriving the changes in 
all variables relative to this benchmark. Consequently, I will use the 
logarithmic notation to denote the percentage changes relative to this 
benchmark. I allow for two stochastic shocks: a monetary (m)  and a 
real shock (4).  Applying equations (4), (3,  (6),  (lo), and (11) yields 
(12) 
Pf.n-k  =e[  Et-(n-k)Pt,n-k  + qr-k - ?qt  + (? - l) 
(a  + p - l/S)P, + (? - 1)mk.l. 
Equation (12) describes the actual price at time t charged by a pro- 
ducer that negotiated the labor contract n -  k periods ago. This price 
is a function of three types of  variables: the expected producer price 
at the time of  the wage negotiation, the price level at time t, and the 
realization of the nominal and the real shocks. 
To  gain further insight it is useful to impose restrictions on the sto- 
chastic structure in order to allow a reduced-form solution of the time 
path of the key variables. For example, consider the case where both 
liquidity m and productivity q follow a random walk: 
(13)  m,  = m,-l + qr. 176  Joshua Aizenman 
(14)  qr  = qr  -I  +  Era 
To simplify exposition I proceed by analyzing two polar cases. I start 
with an economy where all shocks are nominal, and continue with an 
economy where all shocks are real. The general case where both types 
of shocks are present is obtained as a linear combination of these two 
polar cases. 
6.4.1 
I start my analysis by providing the general solution for prices and 
quantities and proceed by  studying the dynamics of  adjustment to a 
nominal shock starting from a long-run equilibrium. 
Following some tedious steps, I can show that the wage setting rule 
and the corresponding prices are given by 
Short-Run Adjustment to Monetary Shocks 
k  n 
(16)  Pi.n-k = 2  Ajqt-(n-j)  +  C  Bjqt-(n-j7 
j=  I  j=k+  I 
+ {m  r-n -  (5 -  1)qr-n -  CI 
1 + (7 -  + a>  whereAj = 
(n -j  + l)/n + (q -  1) (p + a)  + 0'-  1) (p + a)E/n 
(7 -  1) (P + a) 
(n -j  + l)/n + (7 -  1)(P + a) + 0'-  1)  (p + a)E/n' 
and 
where Bj = 
Note that Aj equals the elasticity of the wage for period t that was 
set  at  period  t - (n -  k)  with  respect  to  innovations  at  period 
t -  (n -  J] forj = 1, . . . ,  k. Thus, smaller values ofj  are associated 
with older innovations. From (15) it follows that innovations that took 
place in  or before period  t -  (n - 1) affect the wage with a unitary 
elasticity. The logic of this result stems from the observation that equa- 
tions (6), (7), and (8) imply that the long-run wage is given by m - 
(6 - l)q - c. Because in our economy there are staggered contracts 
whose duration is n, it takes n - 1 periods to accomplish the adjust- 
ment to a given innovation. Once the adjustment is accomplished, it 
affects nominal wages with a unitary elasticity. 
To  gain further insight it is useful to consider the adjustment path to 
shocks starting from a long-run equilibrium at time t - 1. For example, 
suppose that at time t, qr =  1. With the exception of the producers 
that negotiate at period t (l/n of all producers), all the other producers 
do not adjust wages to reflect qr. Applying (15) and (16) yields that 177  Monopoly and Labor Market Adjustment 
and  1  + (7 - 1) (P  + 4 
l/n + (7 - 1)  (p + a)  + (n - 1)  (p  + a).$/n  (17)  wt.0  = Pt,o= 
(18) 
-  PI.1  = Pt.2 =  *  *  . -  Pt,n-1 
-  -  (7 - 1) (P  + 4 
l/n  + (7 - 1)  (p + a)  + (n - 1) (p + a)C/n’ 
(7 - 1)  (p + a)  + l/n 
<1.  (19) 
= l/n + (7 - 1)  (p + a)  + (n - 1) (p + a>gn 
The result of the increase in liquidity is to raise all prices. Note that 
if  all domestic prices rise at the same rate we will obtain an excess 
supply of goods produced by producers that preset wages for time t in 
the past, because they enjoy a cost advantage relative to the producers 
that set their wage at time f. Thus, the presetters will increase prices 
by  less than the producers that are setting wages at time t(i.e., P,,~  < 
P,,~).  The overall effect of the presetting of wages is that the aggregate 
price level rises by less than the implied long-run adjustment (i.e., p, 
<  1). Note also that if (p + a)s < 1, the price and the wage of producers 
that negotiate the contract at time t will overshoot the long-run ad- 
justment (Le., w,,~  = pt.o > 1). Applying (4) and (6) we infer that 
(20)  e, = pt + (1 -  pt)  / (ae)  =  1  + (1 -  pt)  (1 - auF;)/(aE). 
Applying (19) and (20), we infer that the exchange rate depreciation 
exceeds the aggregate price adjustment, implying that the monetary 
shock induces real depreciation in the short run at a rate of 
(21) 
(n - 1)  (p + ayn 
ef -  pt =a[l/n + (7 - 1) (p + a)  + (n -  1)  (p + a)(/n]‘ 
Another  implication  of  equation  (20)  is  that  exchange-rate  over- 
shooting will  occur  if  1  > ac. Note that  (4) and (6) imply that the 
elasticity of the demand for money with respect to the exchange rate 
is ae,  and overshooting will occur if this elasticity falls short of unity.’’ 
We  turn now to an assessment of the short-run output effect of the 
monetary innovation. Note that (1) implies that for any producer k 
(22)  xk  = a(e -  p) + (a  + p) @ -  pk). 
The first term reflects the common effect due to the real depreciation, 
whereas the second term reflects the producer-specific  effect due to 
deviations of  his  prices  from  the  economy’s average price.  As  my 
analysis indicates, the common effect implies that output will rise. The 
producer-specific effect works towards output contraction for “flexi- 
ble”  producers (Le., producers that are setting wages at time t). In 
fact, because of the inelastic supply of labor we obtain that the two 178  Joshua Aizenman 
effects cancel each other for the flexible producers and that x,,~  = 0. 
On the other hand, the producer-specific effect works towards output 
expansion for the producers that preset wages before period t. Direct 
application of (17)-(20) reveals that 
(23)  Xt," =  0. 
-  (24)  x~.,  = . . . -x~,~-I  = (a  + P)/ 
[lln + (3-  1) (P  + a)  + (n - 1)  (P + a)e/nl. 
[1  + n(? - 1) (P  + a)  + (n - 1) (P + ale]. 
(25) 
(25') 
Figure 6.2 plots the dependency of prices and output on the substitut- 
ability between domestic and foreign goods (a).  Notice that  greater 
substitutability  induces greater  output and employment effects  and 
smaller price  effects.  Similar results apply  for the variances  of  the 
variables plotted in figure 6.2 for the case where only monetary shocks 
are affecting the economy. Direct calculation reveals that the degree 
of staggering (i.e., the contract length n)  affects the adjustment in the 
following way 
Xt  = (n - 1)  (a  + P)/ 
if = ? ,I?*  where it is the change in aggregate employment. 
a  it  -  > 0. 
dn 
Longer contracts magnify the exchange rate, the output, and the rel- 
ative price effects induced by monetary shocks in the short run, while 
they dampen the price level adjustment. 
6.4.2  Intermediate-Run Adjustment to Monetary Shocks 
We  turn  now to the adjustment observed in the intermediate run. 
Over time, more wage contracts are renegotiated to reflect the liquidity 
shock. Because the impact effect of the shock is to cause output ex- 179  Monopoly and Labor Market Adjustment 
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Fig. 6.2 
1 /E 
Substitutability (a)  and the adjustment of prices @),  output 
(n), nominal and  real  exchange  rates  (e and  e - B) to  a 
monetary shock. 
pansion at the previously preset wages, forces of excess demand in the 
labor market will raise wages in the renegotiated contracts at a rate 
that will reduce output and employment to the preshock level. This in 
turn will enable other producers to raise prices. Thus, over time ag- 
gregate prices will rise, while aggregate output will drop. This adjust- 
ment in  turn will reduce the real depreciation implied by the initial 
shock. More formally, applying equations (41, (61,  (151,  and (161,  we 
obtain that after k periods the monetary shock qt  = 1 will result in: 
(19’)  Pt+k 
(7 - 1) (p + a)  + (k + l)/n 
(1 + k)/n + (7 - 1)  (p + a)  + (n - (k +  1) ) (p + a)gn 
< 1.  -  - 
(20’)  et+k  = pt+k +  -  Pt+k)/(Or8 
(1 - aO(n -  (k + I))(P + N[nc.SI 
(1  + k)/n + (? - 1) (p + a)  + (n - (k +  1))  (p + a)gn 
=I+ 
(21’)  et+k -  Pr+k 
-  -  (n - (k +  1))  (p  + a)/n 
a[(l + k)/n + (7 - 1)  (p  + a)  + (n -  (k +  1))  (p + a)S/nI’ 
(n -  (k +  1))  (p + a)/n 
(1 + k)/n + (7 - 1)  (p + a)  + (n - (k +  1))  (p + a)[/n’ 
(25”)  jr+k 
-  - 180  Joshua Aizenman 
Note that the condition generating  short-run overshooting (i.e.,  1 > 
(re)  implies also intermediate-run  overshooting, where over time we 
will observe nominal appreciation.  Applying the above equations we 
obtain that the dynamics of intermediate-run  adjustment are charac- 
terized by 
(27)  Apr+k/Ak > 0 
A2pt+kIAk2  >  O 
Pttn-1 =  1 
A.f(+k/ A k < 0 
A2.C,+kIAk2  < 0 
-f+n-l  = 0 
A(@r+k -  pr+k)/Ak  < 0 
A2(eI+k  -  Pt+k)IAk2  < 0 
A@,+klAk  < 0 
A2e,+klAk2  < 0 if  1 > a5 and 
AP,+klAk > 0 
A2 eI+k/Ak2  > O if  1 < 015. 
Figure 6.3 summarizes the dynamics of adjustment of aggregate prices 






Fig. 6.3  The dynamics of  price (p) and output  (X) adjustment  to a 
monetary shock. 181  Monopoly and Labor Market Adjustment 
the speed of adjustment accelerates during the adjustment. Following 
the shock at time  t, the monetary  shock triggers  persistent  relative 
price and output shocks. Over time the shocks to relative prices and 
output will die down at an accelerated rate, and the rise in liquidity is 
absorbed via accelerated aggregate price adjustment. It can be shown 
that smaller substitutability a  will raise the curvature of the adjustment 
path. This in turn implies greater persistency of prices and output during 
the first phase of the adjustment and a more abrupt adjustment towards 
the end of the adjustment cycle. In terms of figure 6.3 we will observe 
that a drop in a  is associated with adjustment on the dotted (instead 
of  on the solid) curves. It is noteworthy that the result regarding the 
accelerated speed of adjustment differs from the one obtained applying 
linear models, where typically the speed of adjustment drops during 
the cycle.13 
6.4.3  Adjustment to Real Shocks 
We  turn now to the case of productivity shocks. We  follow a pro- 
cedure similar to our analysis of nominal shocks. Suppose that we start 
in a long-run equilibrium in period t - 1 and consider the adjustment 
to a productivity shock at time t, given by E,  = 1. Applying the char- 
acteristics of a long-run equilibrium and the corresponding money mar- 
ket equilibrium (equations [2], [4],  and [6]) we obtain that the long-run 
effects of the productivity shock are 
(28)  A2=1 
AD=  -6 
Ae  = (1 - &)/a 
A(e -  D) = l/a 
AW = 1 -  6. 
The productivity shock implies a rise in output and a corresponding 
drop in prices. To  clear the induced excess supply of domestic goods 
we need a real depreciation. There is ambiguity regarding the induced 
exchange rate and wage adjustment. Notice that low substitutability 
(a)  or low output elasticity of demand for money tends to  be associated 
with nominal depreciation, and low income elasticity of the demand 
for money (i.e.,  5 < 1) implies that money wages will go up.*4 
Following some tedious steps, it can be shown that the wage-setting 
rule and the corresponding prices are given by 
k 
j=  I  (15’)  Wt.n-k =  4qj-(n-j) + {mt-n  -  (6 - 1) qt-n -  c>* 182  Joshua Aizenman 
+ {mr-n -  (5 - 1) qt-n -  C) 
where Fj 
1 + (7 - 1) (p + a) + 0' - 1) {p + a - l/E}/n  -  - 
-5, + (3 - 1)  (p + a)  + 0' - 1) {(p + a)  5 - I}/n 
and 
where Gj = Fj - (4  +  1)/{1  + (q - 1) (p + a)}. 
We  turn now to the analysis of the short- and intermediate-run ad- 
justment. Formally, the time path of the variables of  interest is given 
by 
(1 -  5)5(..  + P)(n -  (k +  l))/n 
(k +  l)/n + (a  + p) (3 -  (k +  l)/n) 
(29)  Pr+k = -5 -  1 + (r -  I)@  + a)  + (n -  (k +  1)) {(p + a)[ - l}/n 
<  0.  -  - 
-5 1 + (7 -  1) (p + a)  + (n -  (k +  1)) {(p + a)  5 - l}/n 
(30) 
(31) 
et+k = Pf+k (Ea  - l)/(ta). 
er+k -  Pi+&  =  -Pf+k/(b). 
(32)  fr+k =  -pr+&/c  > 0. 
(33)  if = r[ff+k - 11  =  [a  (et+k -  Pi+&) - I1 
-  (1 -  5) r  (n -  (k +  1))  (P  + 4ln 
1 + (7 - 1) (p + a)  + (n -  (k +  1))  {(p + a)  5; - I}/n. 
- 
The impact effect of the gain in productivity is a drop in prices, a rise 
in output, and real depreciation. This real depreciation is needed to 
clear the incipient excess supply induced by the rise in productivity. 
As can be seen from (29)-(33),  the dynamics of adjustments to the new 
long-run equilibrium are determined by the magnitude of the income 
elasticity of the demand for money  (5). Note that (29) implies that if 
that elasticity  is  smaller than unity,  the short-run drop in  domestic 
goods prices will exceed the long-run adjustment. This will also be the 
case where employment will increase in the short run (see [33]). Hence- 
forth we will assume that this condition is satisfied (i.e., that 5 < 1). 
As is evident from (30), the path of the nominal exchange rate is de- 
termined by the sign of  (1 - .[)/a.  In general, small elasticities (i.e., 
at <  1) are associated with a nominal depreciation and large elasticities 
with a nominal appreciation. The relative complexity of the nominal 
exchange rate adjustment stems from the fact that the nominal exchange 
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factor determining the price level. The expansion of  output calls for 
appreciation to accommodate the drop in domestic prices that is needed 
to clear the money  market and for a depreciation  needed  to  make 
domestic goods cheaper in order to clear the domestic goods market. 
It is the balance of these two forces that determines the path of the 
nominal exchange rate. 
Direct calculation  reveals that  the degree of  staggering (i.e., the 
contract length n)  affects the adjustment according to the relative size 
of the income elasticity of the demand for money. Specifically, I dem- 
onstrated before that if  5 < 1, nominal contracts will  magnify the re- 
sponse to real shocks (relative to the long-run adjustment). Consequently, 
we expect that for 5 < 1  a longer presetting horizon will increase the 
short-run impact of  the shock on prices, the exchange rate, output, 
and employment. This can be verified by equation (29), which implies 
that: 
(34)  a Pt+k  sign -  = sign (6 - 
an 
Figure 6.4 summarizes the dynamics of adjustment. It is drawn for 
the case where 5 < 1. As in the previous discussion, the effect of a 
staggered price path is that we observe an accelerating adjustment to 
Fig. 6.4  The dynamics of price (Is), exchange rate (e),  employment (j), 
and output (3  adjustment to  a real shock (drawn for 5 < 1). 184  Joshua Aizenman 
Fig. 6.5  Substitutability (a)  and the adjustment of  prices (p), output 
(Z),  nominal and real exchange rates (e and e -  p) to a real 
shock (drawn for 5 < I). 
the new long-run equilibrium. It is noteworthy that for E < 1, a larger 
degree of substitutability has the effect of magnifying the short- and 
intermediate-run adjustment of prices  and output to real shocks, re- 
ducing the needed  adjustment of  relative  price~.'~  These results are 
summarized in figure 6.5 (drawn for I; < I). 
6.5  Contract Length 
Our previous discussion was conducted for the case where the con- 
tract length was exogenously given. We  turn now to the analysis of the 
determinants of contract length.I6 Consider the case where each con- 
tract negotiation involves a cost. Negotiating the contract every n pe- 
riods (n  > l) is associated with deadweight losses in the labor market, 
because the employment subject to the preset wage is suboptimal. More 
frequent  wage  negotiation  will  reduce  the net  present  value  of  the 
expected deadweight losses in the labor market, but will raise the net 
present value of  the negotiation costs. The contract length is set to 
balance these two effects at the margin, such that the rise in the net 
present value of expected losses resulting from extending the contract 
by one period equals the drop in the net present value of the negotiation 185  Monopoly and Labor Market Adjustment 
Among the factors determining the contract horizon  are the 
substitutability between goods and the volatility of the shocks affecting 
the economy. It can be shown that a higher volatility of the shocks and 
a greater goods substitutability will raise the deadweight losses in the 
labor market for a given contract length, implying thereby a shortening 
of the contract horizon.I8 Denoting the optimal n by n*  and the variances 
of the shocks by V,, V,,,  we can summarize the factors determining n* 
by: n* = n* (a,  p, V,, V,,), 
where d n* I d a < 0;  d n* I d p < 0; d n* I a V, < 0;  a n* I d  V, < 0. 
6.6  Labor Market Adjustment in the Presence of Misalignment 
The purpose of  this section is to review  the role of labor market 
adjustment in the presence of exchange rate misalignment. We  define 
exchange rate misalignment as a major change in  the real exchange 
rate to a level that is not consistent with full employment in the presence 
of existing labor contracts. This misalignment can be the result of large 
shocks. We start our discussion by classifying these shocks into several 
categories. The first type of shocks is the result of a large realization 
of  the  nominal or real  shocks specified before.  The second type is 
structural shocks that change the underlying parameters, like a change 
in the substitutability between various goods, a change in the share of 
labor in the GNP, changes in the covariance structure of the shocks, 
and so forth. 
Our previous discussion specified a framework that is applicable for 
an economy where the shocks are small enough to operate with con- 
tracts that preset the wage path for several periods. Such a framework 
can be modified to reduce the welfare consequences of the first type 
of shocks significantly. Throughout our discussion we have assumed 
simple noncontingent  labor contracts. The implicit rationale for this 
assumption is that some of this information may be costly or unob- 
servable, or may be adversely affected by the producer. This rationale 
suggests that priority should be given to contingencies that use public 
information that is available in a frequency that exceeds the frequency 
of wage negotiation. A possible candidate that should enhance adjust- 
ment  to the first type of  shocks is wage indexation to the nominal 
GNP.I9 To  verify this point, note that (1) and (5)  imply that if we start 
from a long-run equilibrium, the effect of various shocks is given by:20 
(35)  A1  = A(Z  + p) -  AC -  Aw. 
The change in employment can be approximated as the change in nom- 
inal GNP (the first term) plus the change in the markup (- Ac) minus 
the change in wage. Equation (35) implies that whenever there are no 186  Joshua Aizenman 
structural shocks affecting the markup rate, a wage rule that will index 
the wage  to nominal  income  (i.e.,  Aw  =  A(2  + p))  will  stabilize 
employment. 
Suppose now that the economy is subjected to the second type of 
shocks, that is, structural shocks that affect the markup. Equation (35) 
suggests that if  these shocks are public information in the short run, 
wage  adjustment at a rate equal to the change in  the markup will 
stabilize employment (i.e., Aw = -  Ac). Unlike the case where shocks 
are of the first type, however, one  expects structural shocks to  be harder 
to identify, and indexation to a simple aggregate like nominal GNP will 
not  suffice. In these circumstances, adjustment can be enhanced by 
changing the frequency of wage negotiation. For example, as analyzed 
in 6.4.4, a structural shock in the form of a rise in the substitutability 
between domestic and foreign goods or a rise in the volatility  of real 
and monetary shocks calls for more frequent wage negotiations. 
6.7  Concluding Remarks 
This paper dnalyzed dynamics of adjustment in the presence of stag- 
gered labor contracts in a monopolistic competitive economy. One of 
the key  assumptions of this paper concerns the timing of contracts 
decisions.  It was assumed that the various producers are distributed 
uniformly over time, so that at each point in time an equal fraction of 
the producers (lln)  determines the time path of wages. With this as- 
sumption, the complexity of the problem was reduced significantly. In 
practice, however,  it  is evident that in  many industries the pricing 
decisions  are made at specific  periods  of  time  that are determined 
frequently by industry-specific considerations (like the season of the 
year, the end and the beginning of the school year, and the like). Fur- 
thermore, it was assumed that each producer sets wages for precisely 
n periods.  Again, in reality one typically observes that the length of 
the wage cycle differs across sectors in the economy. Such consider- 
ations were not allowed in the present analysis, and their incorporation 
would constitute a useful extension. 
Notes 
1. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) revived the interest in monopolistic competition. 
A growing body of research has recognized the importance of a limited degree 
of goods substitutability in explaining transmission of macro shocks. See, for 
example,  Rotemberg (1982),  Dornbusch  (1985), Flood  and  Hodrick  (1985), 
Giovannini (1985), Aizenman (1986), Svennson (1986), and Svennson and van 
Wijnbergen (1986). On monopolistic competition in the context of trade models, 
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2. To simplify exposition we consider here the case where the demand is a 
function only of relative prices. Our analysis can be extended to  the case where 
income effects are added without affecting the main results. 
3. Formally, P is defined as P  = 2  [Pk/h].  To simplify notation we assume 
that h is large enough to imply that d F/ d PI =  0. See Aizenman (1986) for an 
alternative analysis (though in a different context) that does not impose this 
assumption. 
4. My analysis could be conducted for the symmetric  case where the “foreign 
good”  is  composed of  a large  number  of  differentiated  products.  See, for 
example, appendix B in Aizenman (1986). 
5. My  analysis can be extended to the case where the supply of  labor is 
dependent on real wages without affecting the main results. My analysis applies 
to economies with limited mobility of  labor. In my model, wages are equated 
across producers only on average, and within  each period  wages will differ 
across producers according to the time of the recent wage negotiation. 
6. Note that as  CX  + m,  ul  + I, u2  + 0, u3  + 0 and O[c -  3 41  + 0. For a discussion 
on the PPP doctrine, see Frenkel (1981). 
7. Allowing for a dependency of the demand for money on the interest rate 
and foreign prices will complicate the reduced-form solutions for all variables, 
but it will not affect the main results regarding the determinants of contract 
lengths and the nature of the adjustment to shocks. 
8. To highlight the role of wage contracts, we assume that prices in the goods 
market are flexible. Alternative modeling strategy can focus on price rigidities 
in the goods market, as in Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), Mussa (1981), Rotem- 
berg (1982), and Aizenman (1986). 
9. The present formulation is related to that of Fischer (1977), who studies 
the determinations of contracts in the presence of two-period  staggered con- 
tracts. The new aspect of the present discussion is in allowing for endogenous 
determination  of  the extent of staggering prices, focusing on the role of sub- 
stitutability between various goods and the stochastic structure in explaining 
the nature of the resultant equilibrium. My approach is closer to  that of Fischer 
(1977) than to that of Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983), who consider a staggered 
equilibrium that sets one price for the presetting horizon, which is taken to be 
exogenously given. This paper applies Fischer’s formulation because it allows 
for a more tractable analysis regarding the role of goods substitutability in the 
determination  of wages and final prices. 
10.  I  start my formulation with  the case where I  do not  allow for preset 
wages contingent on future (presently unavailable) information. At the extreme 
case, where I would make optimal use of  all future information in a contingent 
wage contract, I would converge on the flexible equilibrium economy described 
earlier. This paper does not attempt to provide a theoretical justification for 
noncontingent  contracts (for further discussion  on this  issue see Blanchard 
1979). Rather, their existence is taken for granted. In section 6.6 I will allow 
for limited contingencies by considering wage indexation to nominal income. 
11. This condition is similar to the one derived  in  Dornbusch (1976). It is 
noteworthy that the condition for overshooting of the wage and the price of 
the “flexible”  producers (i.e.,  producers that set wages  at time t)  is  more 
stringent than the condition for exchange rate overshooting. 
12. Note that equation (4) implies that the PPP ratio (i.e., e -  p)  follows a 
time path similar to that of output (f). 
13. See, for example, Dornbusch (1976). 
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14. Formally, depreciation requires that 1 > us,  which is also the condition 
15. This follows from the fact that sign 8 p,+kl  8 a = sign (5 - 1). 
16. I sketch here the framework described in Aizenman (1966, appendix A). 
The analysis there refers to the determination of the desired presetting horizon 
for exchange rate overshooting to nominal shocks. 
of goods~  prices  in  a staggered equilibrium. For a related  analysis see Gray 
(1978). 
17. Note that I assume no coordination among the various producers in their 
contract negotiation. Thus, in calculating the desired contract length from the 
point of view of a producer k (denoted by nk),  the producer balances the marginal 
costs and benefits, assuming that other producers are following a policy of con- 
tract length n. In his calculation the producer is using the information regarding 
the characteristics of the economy in an equilibrium where all producers follow 
a policy of contract length n. The ‘‘equilibrium” n is obtained where the desired 
nk  for each producer coincides with the “market” n. 
18. This is the result of the fact that a higher substitutability  magnifies the 
output effects (and consequently the change in the demand for labor) of a given 
shock (as can be seen from [25’1 and [33]). 
19. For a discussion of wage indexation to nominal GNP, see Marston and 
Turnovsky (1985) and Aizenman and Frenkel (1986). 
20. Equation (5) implies that 9 [a@* + e -  p) - q] - a@* + e - p) + 
w -  p  + c  = 0.  Applying equation (I) to this result, we infer that for small 
deviations from the initial long-run equilibrium 3 [Ai - Aq] - A.f  + Aw - 
Ap  + Ac  = 0.  Applying equation (2) to this result we obtain equation (35) for 
small deviations from the initial long-run equilibrium. 
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Comment  Stephen J. Turnovsky 
Joshua Aizenman has written a very elegant paper. It is primarily about 
the impact of shocks on a small open economy. This is a topic which 
encompasses  an extensive literature,  Aizenman’s  analysis enhances 
this literature by embodying two features: 
(1) The determination of wages through multiperiod contracts 
(2)  The  characterization  of  the  output  market  by  monopolistic 
The introduction  of  overlapping  wage  contracts  is  an extension of 
Fischer-Taylor type models and is fairly familiar. The introduction of 
monopolistic competition into international macroeconomics is much 
less well known, and  here the author applies some of his previous 
work; see Aizenman (forthcoming). 
I shall focus my  remarks on the following aspects: (1) the structure 
of the model, (2) some observations on the implications of the model 
and comparisons with  some standards, and  (3) some comments on 
exchange rate misalignment. 
competition 
Stephen J. Turnovsky is professor of economics at the University of Washington and 
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Review of Model 
The model consists of  three markets: the goods market, the labor 
market, and the money market. The first and third of these are straight- 
forward. Demand and output are specified by Cobb-Douglas type func- 
tions, which have well-known advantages of analytical convenience. 
The specification of the demand for money to depend upon only real 
output is also a great simplification, and I  shall comment further on 
this aspect below. 
The key sector of the model is the labor market, where two situations 
are considered. The first is a benchmark economy in which prices and 
wages are perfectly  flexible. This yields a long-run full employment 
equilibrium in which long-run purchasing power parity holds. Specif- 
ically, the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate equals the ratio of 
the productivity of labor to the degree of  substitutability between do- 
mestic and foreign goods. 
By  contrast, most of the analysis deals with an economy in which 
wages are preset for a number of periods. The wage rule is set such 
that the labor market is expected to clear at each period. This leads to 
the pricing equation (3,  in which the price of the krh producer is de- 
termined as a markup on (1) the domestic price of foreign goods, (2) 
the general price level, and (3) the wage rate. This equation, together 
with the relationship between the average price level and the prices set 
by individual producers at different stages of the contract cycle, is the 
source of the dynamics in the model. 
The model also distinguishes between the short run and the inter- 
mediate run. A key assumption is that wage contracts are negotiated 
at each period for n periods ahead, with a fraction lln of the producers 
signing a contract at each point of time. Thus at time t,  say, we observe 
a vector of wages and prices: 
wr  = (wr.0.  *  *  *  2  wr,n- 11 
Pr  = (Pr.0.  *  3  Pr.n- I) 
where 
wr,i  = wage paid at time t by a producer who signed his wage contract 
pr.i = price set at time t by a producer who signed his wage contract 
Aizenman then solves for pt.n-k,  w~,~-~  as a function of the shocks over 
the life of  the contract, under the assumption that expectations are 
rational.  In the short run the average price pr  is given and all wages 
but the current are taken as preset.  Over the intermediate run, new 
wage contracts are signed and the average price level pr  changes as 
more firms reset their prices. 
i periods ago, 
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With this setup, Aizenman analyzes the effects of  both  monetary 
and real shocks on a number of key macroeconomic variables, including 
(1) the nominal exchange rate, (2) the price level, (3) the real exchange 
rate, and (4)  output. He then considers how these responses change 
with the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, 
as well as analyzing the time profile of the adjustment over the inter- 
mediate run. Since the source of the lags is the contracts which last 
just n periods, all the dynamics take just n periods to complete. 
Some Implications of the Model 
I now comment on some of the implications of the model and compare 
them to more standard models in the literature. The benchmark I shall 
use is a typical stochastic IS-LM model, in which the supply side is 
represented  either by a Lucas supply function (possibly justified  in 
terms of a Gray (1976) type one-period contract) or by  means of a 
Phillips curve giving rise to sluggish prices. 
First, consider the shocks themselves. Aizenman shows how a pos- 
itive monetary disturbance raises the domestic price level and causes 
a depreciation of both the nominal and real exchange rate. A positive 
productivity disturbance is shown to increase output and reduce the 
price level and causes a real depreciation of  the exchange rate. The 
nominal exchange rate may either depreciate or appreciate, depending 
on whether the parameter  015  5 1. Virtually  the identical qualitative 
responses can be shown to occur, for example, in the stochastic short- 
run model of Turnovsky (1983). That model also predicts an indeter- 
minacy of the nominal exchange rate to supply shocks, and when one 
normalizes  the two models for certain aspects of their specification 
(such as deflating the money supply by the CPI in the Turnovsky model), 
the conditions for the response of  the exchange rate are almost the 
same. Finally, as Aizenman himself notes, the conditions for the over- 
shooting of the exchange rate to monetary shocks is the same as in the 
Dornbusch model with flexible output. So overall, the qualitative re- 
sponses of the economy to the two classes of disturbances are not too 
different from what more conventional macro models would predict. 
Aizenman  studies in some detail the effects of an increase in the 
degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods. He shows 
how this raises the responsiveness  of  output to the monetary  shock 
but lowers the responsiveness  of both  the real  and the nominal ex- 
change rate, as well as the price level. Comparing this to the Turnovsky 
model, I now find some differences. A higher degree of substitutability 
has an analogous effect on output, as well as on the nominal and real 
exchange rates. But it now raises, not lowers, the response of the price 
level to a monetary shock. 
The reason is straightforward. In either economy, as the degree of 
substitutability cx increases, the real exchange rate becomes less flex- 192  Joshua Aizenman 
ible. More of the adjustment in the real sector in response to a monetary 
shock must be borne by output and less by the real exchange rate. But 
in the Turnovsky model, supply is determined by a Lucas supply func- 
tion, or in other words, by  price surprises.  Output is therefore pro- 
portional to short-run price  movements.  Hence any increase in  the 
responsiveness of  output must be reflected by  an increase in the re- 
sponsiveness of the price level. 
I now turn to the dynamic adjustment. The key feature of  the dy- 
namics is that the responses of prices and output to either a monetary 
or a supply shock accelerate over the n periods of  the adjustment, 
which is determined by the contract length. This is in marked contrast 
to a conventional sluggish price model such as Dornbusch (1976), in 
which these responses decelerate over time and take an infinite time 
to complete. As a further contrast, the Lucas-Gray one-period contract 
model yields no persistence from such shocks; the adjustment is com- 
pleted within just one period. 
The reason for the dynamics in the Aizenman model stems from the 
relationship relating the average price at time t to the prices set by the 
1 
individual producers at that time, namely, pr = -  + pr,, + . . . + 
n 
pt.r-,J.  Over time, an increasing number of firms will renegotiate their 
contracts. Since their wages rise, they increase their prices by a greater 
amount than do those producers whose wages are preset by preexisting 
contracts. The more firms that go through the renegotiating cycle, the 
larger the increase in  the average price level, although  this process 
comes to an abrupt halt after time n, when all firms have renegotiated. 
The dynamic time paths illustrated in figures 6.3 and 6.4 of Aizen- 
man’s paper are strong predictions of the model, and one may quite nat- 
urally ask whether these are likely to be the kind of  dynamics one 
observes in response to a monetary disturbance. While one might doubt 
that this is the case, it is intriguing to note that the dynamic time path 
for the average price p, illustrated in figure 6.3 is identical to that en- 
countered in simple models which analyze the effects of “announced” 
monetary disturbances. More specifically, consider the dynamics of the 
Cagan model as described in Sargent and Wallace’s (1973) well-known 
paper. As their analysis showed, a monetary expansion announced at 
time 0, say, to take effect at time T > 0, will lead to an adjustment path 
in the price level identical to that of figure 6.3. There is an initial jump 
increase in the price level, with steady acceleration until time T, when 
the announced monetary expansion takes place and the adjustment is 
completed. The acceleration reflects the fact that during the adjustment 
phase, the economy is following an unstable dynamic time path. There 
is a parallel here, since the contract which presets wages over a number 
of periods serves very much as an announcement. 193  Monopoly and Labor Market Adjustment 
Aizenman’s model  is  of  course  based  on  several  simplifying as- 
sumptions, and I would like to briefly comment on two. The first is the 
assumption that the supply of labor is inelastic. If  one were to drop 
this assumption and assume instead that the supply of labor depends 
upon the expected real wage rate, we would immediately  introduce 
two real wage rates into the model. While producers would evaluate 
the real wage in terms of the price of their good, workers would base 
their decisions on the real wage defined in terms of the consumer price 
index. In the standard Gray-type contract models, this distinction com- 
plicates the contract somewhat, and it must surely do so here as well. 
Secondly, the demand for money is assumed to be interest inelastic. 
If instead the demand for money were to depend upon the interest rate, 
forward-looking behavior would be introduced into price setting. As it 
stands, the price equation (12) is entirely backward looking. 
Misalignment of Exchange Rates 
The model presented is a descriptive one. It tells us how the economy 
responds to the two types of disturbances introduced in the paper. But 
it is well known from previous work on stochastic macroeconomics 
that the impact of  shocks depends critically upon the policy regimes 
in operation. In particular, it will depend upon (1) monetaryxxchange 
market  policy and (2) labor market-wage  indexation policy.  This is 
touched upon briefly in the paper, but it would seem to merit further 
discussion. 
Long-run optimal real exchange rate equilibrium is defined by the 
flexible price model through the relation S = 2 + p* -  fi = 4/01,  where 
- denotes steady-state levels. One can then view the deviation of the 
current real  exchange rate  s  from s, (s  - S)  as a measure of  real 
exchange rate misalignment. An important question to address is how 
wage indexation and monetary rules, based on responding to the mis- 
alignment s - S and the shocks this embodies, can be designed to 
achieve some specified optimality objective. This is a natural extension 
of  previous work  by  Aizenman  and Frenkel  (1985)  and  Turnovsky 
(1987). These  studies emphasize the tradeoffs  and interdependence 
between labor market and monetary policies under different sets of 
information  structures. The existence of  multiperiod wage contracts 
raises the question of the optimal degrees of indexation of different 
wages at different points in the contract cycle. Aizenman’s paper could 
be extended to examine this issue. 
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